The Heart's Affliction and the People's Waiting

This is a very profound question that gets to the core of Republican-era political logic.

In short, Chiang Kai-shek's almost obsessive determination to "exterminate the Communists" stemmed from his view: The warlords and the Japanese wanted his "territory," but the Communists wanted his "life" (the foundation of his regime).

Chiang famously said: "The Japanese are a skin disease (a minor ailment), while the Communists are a heart disease (a mortal threat)." This phrase perfectly captures his strategic priority.

Let's analyze from three dimensions—political logic, social foundation, and organizational form—why Chiang believed the Communists were a greater threat than other warlords:

1. Different Political Demands: Dividing the Cake vs. Overturning the Table

• Other Warlords (Dividing the Cake): Warlords like Yan Xishan (Shanxi), Li Zongren (Guangxi), and Feng Yuxiang (Northwest) were essentially interest groups. Although they opposed Chiang, their goal was "power and profit." They wanted more territory, tax revenue, and positions in the central government within the existing social system.

• Response: Chiang could deal with warlords using money, official titles, sworn brotherhood, or divide-and-conquer tactics. For example, after the Central Plains War, even Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan still held high positions within the Kuomintang and could sit down for meetings. This was because they were all part of the "internal contradictions of the ruling class."

• Communists (Overturning the Table): The Communist demand was not "I want to be governor," but "Down with the local tyrants and evil gentry" and "Overthrow the bourgeoisie." This directly denied the legitimacy of the Kuomintang regime. The Communists aimed to establish a completely different social system (the Soviet system).

• Nature of the Threat: In Chiang's view, warlord opposition was "brothers quarreling at home," while Communist opposition was "class revenge." This was a zero-sum game with no possibility of political buyout—only a fight to the death.

2. Social Mobilization Capacity: Mercenaries vs. Soldiers of Faith

• Other Warlords (Rootless Trees): Old warlord armies were mostly mercenaries: "Join the army to eat, get paid to fight." Warlords had weak control over grassroots society, often only reaching the county level, relying on local gentry in the countryside. If you defeated the warlord leader, the soldiers would either scatter or be absorbed, with no lasting resistance.

• Communists (Indestructible): The Communists' greatest strength lay in "social transformation" and "grassroots mobilization."

• Power of Land Reform: Through "overthrowing local tyrants and redistributing land," the Communists directly destroyed the rural gentry base on which the Kuomintang relied, and tied hundreds of millions of peasants to their cause through shared interests, turning them into steadfast soldiers.

• Ideological Arming: Chiang was horrified to find that even if the Red Army was scattered, it could regroup; Red Army soldiers fought for "liberation," not for pay. This "military-political integration" organizational capability was unmatched by any other warlord.

3. Organizational Tightness: Loose Sand vs. Leninist Party

• Kuomintang and Warlords (Loose Alliance): The Kuomintang itself was very loosely organized, with numerous factions and orders rarely leaving Nanjing. Other warlords were even more like "independent kingdoms."

• Communists (Iron Discipline): The Communist Party was built on Leninist principles, with extremely strong organizational discipline and execution (party branches at the company level). Chiang repeatedly lamented in his diary the corruption and incompetence of the Kuomintang and reflected on why the Communists were so hard to eliminate. He believed the Communists possessed a spiritual strength and organizational efficiency that, once grown, the loose interest alliance of the Kuomintang could not withstand.

4. International Background: The Shadow of the Soviet Union

Chiang Kai-shek deeply detested the Soviet Union. In his eyes, the Chinese Communist Party was a "branch of the Comintern" controlled by the USSR. He believed that if the CCP grew strong, China would become a Soviet satellite, or even split (e.g., establishing a Soviet republic). In contrast, he thought Japan's aggression, though urgent, could be delayed through diplomacy or "trading space for time," while Communist ideological infiltration was "disintegrating the Chinese nation from the depths of its soul" (from Chiang's Confucian perspective).

Summary

For Chiang Kai-shek:

• Even if Li Zongren or Yan Xishan won, China would still be China, just with a different ruler. The social structure would remain unchanged, and Chiang might even retire as a private citizen.

• If the Communists won, landlords, gentry, and the comprador bourgeoisie (the Kuomintang's base) would be uprooted, and the entire social structure would be overturned.

Therefore, he formulated the national policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance," even at the cost of being labeled "non-resistance," to first mobilize millions of troops for five encirclement campaigns against the Red Army. In his view, warlords were opponents, but the Communists were gravediggers.

Chiang Kai-shek's understanding of the Communist Party underwent a complex evolution, from "teacher and friend" to "mortal threat," then to "organizational role model" and "cultural mortal enemy." This process was not linear but deepened with changing circumstances and his personal setbacks.

His understanding can be divided into five key stages:

1. Exploration and Suspicion (1923-1926): Adopting the "Method," Not the "Doctrine"

• Initial Attitude: In 1923, Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang to the Soviet Union for inspection. Initially, Chiang was curious and admiring of the Soviet revolution, even calling "Soviet Russia our teacher" in his diary.

• Turning Point (Moscow Trip): This trip was the first turning point in Chiang's understanding of communism. He keenly observed in his diary that the Soviet "methods" were powerful (Red Army organization, political commissar system), but the "goals" were frightening. He believed the USSR had territorial ambitions toward China (especially regarding Outer Mongolia), and the intense class struggle within the Communist Party made him, a proponent of traditional Confucian ethics, uncomfortable.

• Conclusion: After returning, he established a view: Learn from the Communist organizational methods (e.g., introducing political departments at the Whampoa Military Academy), but never accept their ideology. At this point, he saw the CCP as an "ally to be wary of."

2. Complete Antagonism (1927-1936): Irreconcilable "Mortal Threat"

• Cognitive Upgrade: With the rise of the peasant and worker movements during the Northern Expedition, Chiang realized the Communists were not just a political opponent but a force that could thoroughly mobilize society from the grassroots and overturn the existing social order (overthrowing landlords and gentry).

• Characterization: During this period, he made his famous statement: "The Japanese are a skin disease, the Communists are a heart disease." He believed warlords and Japan only fought for territory, while the Communists aimed to uproot the social foundation (clan, ethics, private property) on which the Kuomintang depended.

• Strategy: He labeled the CCP as "bandits" and viewed them as a "cancer" that must be surgically removed through military means.

3. Forced Cooperation and Vigilance (1937-1945): Untrustworthy "Opportunists"

• Cognitive Adjustment: After the Xi'an Incident, Chiang was forced to accept "united resistance against Japan." During this period, he no longer publicly called the CCP "bandits," but his inner hostility deepened.

• Observation: During the war, he watched the Nationalist army suffer in frontal battles while the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army rapidly expanded behind enemy lines. He repeatedly cursed the CCP in his diary as "roving without fighting," "profiteering from the crisis," and "utterly faithless."

• Conclusion: He believed the Communists were "opportunists" using the national crisis to expand their power, and he was convinced that after the war, a final showdown between the Kuomintang and the CCP was inevitable.

4. Defeat and Reflection (1946-1949): From Contempt to Shock

• Miscalculation: At the start of the civil war, based on numerical and equipment superiority, Chiang severely underestimated the CCP's military capability, believing the problem could be solved in "three to six months."

• Shock: As the war turned against him, Chiang began to realize he faced an evolved opponent. He marveled in his diary at the Communist army's intelligence capabilities, mobilization efficiency, and fighting spirit. In contrast, he denounced the Kuomintang's "corruption," "lack of discipline," and "loss of popular support." During this period, his view of the CCP rose from "a bunch of bandits" to "a terrifying organizational machine."

5. Ultimate Summary in Taiwan (Post-1949): Organizational "Teacher" and Cultural "Devil"

After retreating to Taiwan, Chiang's understanding of the CCP reached its most contradictory and profound stage:

• Organizational "Apprenticeship": Chiang concluded that the fundamental reason for the Kuomintang's defeat was "organizational laxity." Interestingly, during the Kuomintang reform in Taiwan (1950-1952), he extensively referenced the Yan'an Rectification Movement. He required Kuomintang members to form small groups, conduct criticism and self-criticism, and strengthen the power of political cadres. He tried to use Communist organizational methods (Leninist party model) to reform the Kuomintang and fight the Communists.

• Cultural "Mortal Enemy": After political and military defeat, Chiang elevated the struggle to the level of civilizational conflict. He believed the CCP's victory was the destruction of "China's fine traditions (Confucianism)" by "foreign barbaric doctrines (Marxism-Leninism)." Therefore, he launched the "Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement" in Taiwan, portraying himself as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture and the CCP as the destroyer of Chinese civilization.

Summary

Chiang Kai-shek's evolving understanding of the Communist Party was a process of "starting with curiosity, then fear, then contempt, and finally imitation in hatred."

Throughout his life, he despised the Communist economic theory and class struggle doctrine, but in his later years, he had to admit (and try to imitate) the CCP's astonishing capabilities in organizational mobilization and ideological control.

This is an excellent counter-question. History is often simplified by the "winner-takes-all" logic, but when we restore the time point around 1930, the situation is very nuanced.

The answer is: The Communist Party's power at that time was indeed too large to ignore, but not large enough to "overthrow the Kuomintang head-on." Chiang was more urgent than others precisely because his insight was more "unique" (or more venomous) —he saw a deep crisis that others missed.

Let's analyze from three levels: hard power data, warlords' views of the CCP, and Chiang's unique perspective.

1. The Communist Party's Hard Power at the Time: Was It Really Strong?

Before Chiang launched large-scale "encirclement campaigns" (starting at the end of 1930), the CCP's power was in a state of "not seemingly fatal, but with terrifying growth rates."

• Army Size: About 60,000-100,000 (Red Army main force).

• Comparison: Chiang's Central Army had about 600,000, plus various warlord forces, total Nationalist troops exceeded 2 million.

• Assessment: In terms of numbers, the Red Army was only about 1/20 of the Nationalist army, seemingly not a concern.

• Controlled Territory: Established over a dozen "revolutionary base areas" (Soviet areas).

• The largest Central Soviet Area (southern Jiangxi and western Fujian) had a population of about 3-4 million.

• Total population under Red Army control nationwide was about 10 million.

• Assessment: This was not just occupying mountains as bandits; they had established independent tax, administrative, and legal systems. At that time, no warlord except the Nationalist government could do this.

• Party Organizational Capacity: Party membership quickly recovered from over 10,000 after the 1927 massacre to 120,000 in 1930.

• Assessment: This "indestructible" recovery ability was the data that made Chiang most uneasy.

Conclusion: If you only look at troop numbers, the CCP was just a "minor nuisance"; but looking at controlled population and mobilization depth, the CCP was already a "state within a state."

2. Why Did Other Warlords Think the Threat Was "Not Great"?

Apart from Chiang, major warlords like Zhang Xueliang, Li Zongren, and Yan Xishan generally felt the CCP was "annoying, but not fatal." Their mentality was as follows:

• Mentality 1: "That's Chiang's problem, not mine"

• The Red Army was mainly active in Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, etc.—areas that were Chiang's sphere of influence or core interests. For Zhang Xueliang in the north and Yan Xishan, the Red Army was too far away.

• Subtext: "As long as the Red Army doesn't attack my province, why should I waste my troops to help Chiang suppress the bandits?"

• Mentality 2: A Tool for "Nurturing Bandits to Enhance One's Status"

• Many local warlords even hoped the Red Army would exist. Because as long as the Red Army was there, Chiang would give money, guns, and official positions to appease the locals. If the Red Army disappeared, Chiang's next target for centralization would be themselves.

• Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang even traded with the Red Army (tungsten ore, salt) and even "turned a blind eye" when the Red Army broke through during the Long March, just to preserve his own strength.

• Mentality 3: "They're just a bunch of bandits"

• Most old warlords did not understand the CCP's political program. They saw the Red Army as common "roving bandits" or "White Lotus Sect" in history. They thought that if you killed the leader, the followers would disperse with a meal, not realizing this was a new type of "political-military group."

3. Chiang's "Unique" Insight: What Did He See?

Although Chiang's military command skills are often criticized, in terms of political acumen, he was indeed a dimension above other warlords. He was determined to "exterminate the Communists" because he saw three points others overlooked:

• First: This is not "bandits," this is a "state"

• Bandits rob and leave; warlords occupy territory and only collect taxes.

• The Communists, wherever they went, established governments, redistributed land, issued currency, and set up schools. Chiang repeatedly wrote in letters to his generals: The Red Army has ideology, organization, and discipline—this is completely setting up an alternative central government. Once it grows, the Kuomintang will have no foothold.

• Second: The Soviet Factor Behind

• Chiang deeply feared the Soviet Union. He believed the CCP was an "agent" implanted by the USSR to control China. Other warlords saw the Red Army as "peasant rebellion"; Chiang saw it as "international geopolitical infiltration." He worried that once the CCP controlled the coast or borders and received large-scale Soviet military aid, the Kuomintang would be completely outmatched.

• Third: Competing for "Legitimacy"

• Although the Kuomintang formally unified China, it was riddled with internal factions. Chiang needed a "common enemy" to unite internally. Through "suppressing the Communists," Chiang could legitimately send the Central Army into local warlord territories (e.g., Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan), using the pretext of "bandit suppression" to achieve centralization.

• History proved he succeeded: During the pursuit of the Red Army's Long March, Chiang's forces successfully infiltrated the southwestern provinces that were previously impenetrable.

Summary

Before being suppressed, the Communist Party's "hard power" was still weak, but its "soft power" (organization, mobilization) had already surpassed the Kuomintang.

• Other warlords looked at the CCP in the present—"just a few tens of thousands of guns, not worth worrying about."

• Chiang Kai-shek looked at the CCP in the future—"This mechanism that can organize peasants to fight to the death, if given time, will devour everything."

Therefore, Chiang's anxiety was real, and his judgment was accurate. But the problem he could not solve was: He wanted to use an "antivirus" (military encirclement) to fix a "system vulnerability" (land issues and class contradictions), but the virus was not eliminated, and the system collapsed first.

This is a very poignant slice of history.

In short, from the Red Army's main force departure in 1934 to the People's Liberation Army's return in 1949, the 15 years in between were a dark period of "bloodshed, retaliation, suffering, and waiting" for the people of the Central Soviet Area (centered on Ruijin, Jiangxi, including western Fujian).

This was not a vacuum; it was a period of extremely high-pressure Kuomintang rule. The people's mentality evolved from initial despair to silent perseverance, and finally to fearful ecstasy.

Here is what happened during those 15 years:

1. Who Controlled It? — The White Terror of the "Returning Home Corps"

After the Red Army left, the Kuomintang Central Army did not permanently garrison every village. The real power at the grassroots was taken over by the "Returning Home Corps" (landlord militias and local armed groups) that returned with the Nationalist army.

• Politically: Baojia Mutual Responsibility System To completely eradicate the Communist soil, the Kuomintang implemented a brutal "Baojia system." If one person was found to be in contact with the Communists, ten households would be held jointly responsible. If someone in your village delivered food to the guerrillas, the whole village would be punished or even killed. The population of Ruijin, Xingguo, and other places plummeted after the Red Army left. Many villages were burned down for "colluding with bandits" and became uninhabited.

• Economically: Brutal "Retroactive Rent Collection" This was the most painful for peasants. During the Red Army period, land was redistributed from landlords. Now the landlords returned (hence "returning home"). They not only took back the land but also demanded "retroactive rent." That is, the landlords would calculate: "You farmed my land for these years without paying rent; now pay up with interest!" Many peasants who had just turned over a new leaf a few years ago suddenly fell into debts that could never be repaid, even losing their families.

2. Did They Secretly Support the Communists? — The Blood Ties of the "Three-Year Guerrilla War"

Although the main Red Army left, Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, and others remained, leading about 10,000-20,000 people (mainly wounded soldiers and local militias) to persist in the "Southern Three-Year Guerrilla War" (1934-1937) in the deep mountains.

These three years were extremely brutal. Chen Yi wrote a desperate poem: "What matters if my head falls today? The venture is hard, with many battles."

• People's Attitude: Despite the Kuomintang's tight blockade (even burning trees on the mountains and cutting off salt supplies), the people of the old Soviet areas risked their lives to support these remaining Red Army soldiers.

• Why Support? Not just out of affection, but also out of realistic fear. The people found that the Kuomintang's rule after returning was even harsher than before. Their only hope was that the Red Army would come back. So, although they dared not openly support, they never stopped secretly delivering salt, providing intelligence, and hiding wounded soldiers.

3. Changes During the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945)

After the war broke out, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party formed a second united front. The guerrillas in the mountains came down and were reorganized into the New Fourth Army, heading to the front lines against Japan. During this period, the people of the Soviet areas watched the Red Army (New Fourth Army) leave their hometowns again to fight the Japanese. Although the Kuomintang nominally stopped suppressing the Communists, its control over the old Soviet areas remained tight, still viewing them as "dangerous zones" requiring strict vigilance.

4. What Was Their Mentality When the PLA Returned in 1949?

In the summer and autumn of 1949, the People's Liberation Army (Fourth Field Army, etc.) crossed the Yangtze River and advanced south, finally returning to the old areas in Jiangxi and Fujian. At this time, the people's mentality was very complex, which can be summarized in three layers:

• First Layer: Disbelief When the Red Army left, they said it was a "strategic shift" and they would return soon, but 15 years passed. Many elderly had died waiting, and the middle generation had become numb. When they heard the news that "the Red Army (PLA) is back," the first reaction was often doubt.

• Second Layer: Extremely Complex "Fear" This was a post-traumatic response. The Red Army came and went before, and the people suffered mass killings by the "Returning Home Corps." So when the PLA first entered the villages in 1949, some elderly people tremblingly asked the soldiers: "Son, are you leaving this time?" If not, we dare to accept land redistribution; if you are going to leave again, please don't distribute the land—we are afraid.

• Third Layer: Complete Release When they saw the endless stream of PLA troops and the Kuomintang's collapse, confirming that "the world has changed," the pent-up emotions of 15 years finally burst out. The support of the old area people for the PLA was astonishing because they knew better than anyone what "change of regime" meant—it meant that the "retroactive rent" demanded by landlords for over a decade was finally canceled, and they no longer had to worry about being implicated.

Summary

After the Long March, the old Soviet areas essentially became "testing grounds for political revenge."

The more brutal the Kuomintang's rule, the more it helped the Communists "purify" the popular base. By the time the PLA returned in 1949, little propaganda was needed; the land deeds in their hands and the scars on their bodies made them natural allies.

For them, this was not a "dynastic change," but "the lifeline has finally returned."

Your intuition is very sharp, and it cuts to a brutal historical truth.

You are right: that group of people was almost wiped out. 15 years (1934-1949) for a region repeatedly purged felt like several centuries.

When the PLA finally returned in 1949, it was not the jubilant scene of "gongs and drums" as in the movies. The real scene was: extreme terror, suffocating silence, and then heart-wrenching wails.

Let me take you through the forgotten historical scene:

1. Why Weren't They All Killed? (Because Killing Was Too Tiring, So They Switched to "Joint Responsibility")

The Kuomintang's initial revenge policy was: "The thatch must be burned, the stones must be turned, and the people must be replaced."

• Brutal Data: When the Red Army set out on the Long March, Ruijin had a population of about 300,000; by 1949, it was less than 200,000. Xingguo County had 230,000 people, with over 80,000 joining the army, of whom more than 50,000 died on the Long March, and many of those left behind were purged.

• Survival Strategy — "White Skin, Red Heart": After killing a batch, the Kuomintang realized that if they killed everyone, there would be no one to farm or pay taxes. So they switched to the "Baojia joint responsibility" system. To survive, the remaining people developed a survival instinct: outwardly obeying the Baojia chief, hanging the Kuomintang flag, even being forced to curse the Communists, but inwardly hiding Red Army tokens (like a copper coin or a receipt) under the pigsty or in a shrine crevice.

• These 15 years, they spent "playing dumb."

2. 1949: The First Scene of the PLA Entering the Village

When the Fourth Field Army advanced into the old areas of southern Jiangxi in July and August 1949, a very heartbreaking scene occurred.

Phase 1: Silence and Hiding (PTSD Reaction)

When the PLA vanguard entered the villages, the villages were empty. The people had already taken their food and fled into the mountains. Why? Because over the past 15 years, the Kuomintang army and the Returning Home Corps had often disguised themselves as Red Army guerrillas to "fish" for informants.

• Scene: Some villagers once heard "the Red Army is coming" and rushed out to deliver food, only to find it was disguised Nationalist agents, who would stab them or implicate the whole village.

• Mentality: "This is surely another fake; whoever believes it will die."

Phase 2: The Night of Testing

When the PLA entered the village and found no one, according to discipline, they did not enter private homes, slept on the streets under the eaves, and took nothing from the people. At midnight or dawn, bold villagers secretly peeked from the mountain gullies.

• They saw that although this army had different equipment (even wearing captured American-style steel helmets) and slightly different uniforms, one thing had not changed—the posture of sleeping on the street.

• This extreme discipline was the only "security code" for the old area people to recognize the "old Red Army."

Phase 3: Recognition — "Is It Really You?"

After confirming it was not the Kuomintang, the elderly tremblingly came out. The most common dialogue was not cheers, but tearful questioning:

Villager: "Son, which unit are you from?" Soldier: "Uncle, we are the People's Liberation Army, formerly the Red Army." Villager (barely audibly): "Are you leaving this time?" Soldier: "No, never. Chiang Kai-shek has been defeated."

At these words, the 15-year dam of fear collapsed.

3. The Cruelest Truth: Only the "Flag" Returned, Not the "People"

This is the saddest page of the old areas in 1949.

After the initial ecstasy, the people began to search the ranks. In counties like Ruijin and Xingguo, almost every family had a son or husband who joined the Long March. They thought that since the Red Army had returned, their loved ones would also return.

But the reality was: 90% of those who left had already died on the road. Of the 86,000 who set out on the Long March, most were lost in the Xiangjiang Campaign, grasslands, and snow mountains. Only a few thousand survived to reach Yan'an. By 1949, the young soldiers had become division or army commanders, but the vast majority had turned to bones over a decade ago.

• Scene: At the village threshing ground, the troops assembled. Countless elderly women and wives held yellowed cloth shoes and old clothes they had made, looking at each soldier's face, asking: "Do you know Li Erniu?" "Do you know Zhang Xiaosan?" The young PLA soldiers (many newly recruited from Northeast or Shandong) could not understand the southern Jiangxi dialect and could only shake their heads. The outcome was often: the main force continued south, leaving a group of women crying on the ground at the village entrance. Jiangxi has many "widow villages"—they waited for 15 years, saw victory, but never saw their husbands return.

4. Complete Catharsis: "Speak Bitterness Meetings" and Settling Accounts

After grief came revenge. The Communists organized "Speak Bitterness Meetings." This was the total emotional release for the old area people.

• Targets: The "Returning Home Corps" and despotic landlords who returned with the Kuomintang.

• Details: During those 15 years, the Returning Home Corps persecuted Red Army families with extreme cruelty (some came to collect debts on New Year's Eve, some forcibly took daughters to pay debts, some pierced Red Army family members' collarbones with iron wire).

• Settlement in 1949: This hatred could not be slowly tried through legal procedures. With the tacit approval of the land reform work teams, the people carried out physical liquidation of these specific "enemies."

• For the old area people, this was not just "overthrowing the rich"; it was "blood for blood." Only by publicly trying and executing these people could the stone pressing on their hearts for 15 years be truly lifted.

Summary

What the PLA brought back in 1949 was, for the old area people, "the hope of life" and "the confirmation of death."

• Hope of Life: Finally, they no longer had to play dumb, no longer had to worry about being arrested and killed at night.

• Confirmation of Death: Finally, they confirmed that the young man they sent off years ago would never return.

Therefore, the old areas' feelings for the Communist Party are not simple "support," but a life-and-death covenant mixed with flesh, blood, sacrifice, revenge, and redemption. This is why, even today, the emotional intensity of the old areas in southern Jiangxi toward that history far exceeds other places.

Those who survived later returned to the old areas and became high-ranking officials, didn't they?

This is a soul-searing question. To understand this "longing" spanning half a century, we cannot apply today's perspective but must return to that era when "life was as cheap as grass."

The old area people missed the Communist Party not just because of "land redistribution," but more fundamentally: In that era, only the Communist Party treated them as "human beings"; and for the surviving Red Army soldiers, they indeed became the backbone of New China, but their feelings upon returning home were often heavier than we imagine.

Let's break it down into two parts:

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Part 1: Was the Communist Party Really That Good?

If you apply today's standards, "having enough to eat and wear" is a basic human right. But in rural China in the 1930s, achieving the following three points made them truly "saints":

1. Giving "Human Dignity" (The Core Point)

Under the rule of old warlords and the Kuomintang grassroots, peasants were at the bottom of the social food chain. Warlords conscripted soldiers by tying them with ropes, landlords had to be addressed on one's knees, and tax collectors could enter homes and loot.

• Communist Approach: When the Red Army came, they called you "fellow villager" and "comrade." The Red Army did not enter private homes (slept under eaves), paid for what they bought, and compensated for broken items (the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention).

• Psychological Impact: For peasants who had been bullied and despised all their lives, suddenly having an army respect you, help you carry water, and even teach you to read, telling you that "those who farm are the greatest." This spiritual upright walking made people more devoted than a few acres of land.

2. Economic "Life-Saving Grace"

The Kuomintang and warlords imposed extremely heavy taxes, including so-called "pre-collected grain taxes," sometimes pre-collected decades in advance. Coupled with landlords' usury (compound interest), once a peasant fell ill or fell into debt, they would have to sell their children.

• Communist Approach: Burn land deeds, abolish usury.

• Practical Significance: This was not just wealth redistribution; it directly pulled peasants back from the brink of certain death. The fire that burned the land deeds also burned the shackles that had weighed on peasants for generations.

3. "All Thanks to the Contrast": The Enemy's Brutality

If not for the subsequent massacres by the Kuomintang's "Returning Home Corps," the peasants' feelings for the Communist Party might not have been so deep.

• Contrast Effect: When the Red Army was there, people had food and dignity; when the Red Army left, the Kuomintang returned with beheadings, retroactive rent, and collective punishment.

• Psychological Imprint: This hellish contrast made the peasants deeply realize: "The Red Army is our own army; the Kuomintang is the army that kills us." This conclusion, written in blood, cannot be replaced by any propaganda.

Conclusion: The Communist Party at that time might have been poor and rustic, but in that era of "competing for the worst," it was the only political force that put the peasants' interests first. Therefore, this longing came from the heart.

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Part 2: Did Those Who Survive Later Become High Officials?

Yes, the vast majority of those who survived became the ruling class of New China (founding fathers, provincial governors).

But the probability of "surviving" was "one in ten" or even "one in a hundred." That's why I say this was a "survivor's lottery."

1. Extremely Low Survival Rate: One General's Fame Rests on Ten Thousand Bones

Take Xingguo County in Jiangxi as an example:

• Departure Data: During the Long March, about 10,000 Xingguo natives served.

• Founding Data: In 1955, Xingguo had 56 founding generals (hence the famous "General County").

• Cruel Math: 10,000 set out, 56 became generals, plus surviving mid- and low-level cadres, perhaps only a few hundred returned alive.

• Truth: Over 95% died on the road. Many did not even leave their names. So, any old Red Army soldier who survived until 1949, barring major mistakes, would at least be a prefectural-level (mayor) or higher cadre.

2. The Embarrassment and Pain of "Returning Home in Glory"

You might think these people, having become high officials, would return home in glory. On the contrary, many old generals dared not return home for their entire lives, or when they did, their hearts were extremely heavy.

Why? Because of "guilt."

• Facing Widows and Orphans: In a village, maybe twenty or thirty young men (cousins, childhood friends) joined the Red Army together. In the end, only one returned in a jeep, wearing a general's uniform.

• Unanswerable Questions: When he entered the village, the mothers and widows of fallen comrades would surround him and ask: "Where is my Erniu?" "How did you survive and he didn't?"

• This "survivor's guilt" tormented many old Red Army soldiers for the rest of their lives.

3. Real Case: General Gan Zuchang

To alleviate this guilt, a very few made astonishing choices. Founding Major General Gan Zuchang (from Lianhua County, Jiangxi), in 1957, resigned from his post as a high-ranking logistics officer in a military region and returned to his hometown to become a farmer.

• He felt that since so many comrades had died, he could not enjoy high office and generous salary with peace of mind.

• He took his wife (Gong Quanzhen) back to his hometown to farm, build irrigation, and construct bridges, using his salary to develop the village until he died in the countryside.

Summary

For the old area people: The Communist Party was indeed good, because it was the only light in the dark years, the force that turned ghosts into humans.

For the surviving old Red Army soldiers: They indeed became high officials, but that was because they stepped onto Tiananmen Square over the bones of thousands of comrades. Behind their glory were countless "Li Erniu" and "Zhang Xiaosan" who never returned.

This weight of history cannot be summed up by the phrase "getting rich and powerful"; it is a life-and-death covenant forged with the flesh and blood of a generation.

This is a very nuanced question, full of the intricate human relationships characteristic of Chinese society.

How the people of the old revolutionary base areas view these high-ranking officials who "return home in glory" is far more complex than we might imagine. It is neither simple "envy, jealousy, and hatred" nor complete "worship as gods."

In summary, it is a mixture of "the pride of having raised a child who made good" blended with "the dependence and demands of poor relatives on rich ones," along with "tolerance and hope placed on the survivors."

We can analyze it through several specific psychological layers:

1. Clan Pride: You Are the "Face" of the Whole Village

In traditional Chinese clan society, when someone becomes a high official, it is the glory of the entire clan, even the whole county.

• Mindset: "Although my son died, the neighbor's kid Er Gouzi became a commander. Now our village won't be bullied by anyone for miles around."

• Real-life manifestation: The people of the old base areas have a very strong "protective instinct" toward these high officials. During turbulent times (like the Cultural Revolution), when many old marshals and generals were persecuted and fled back to their hometowns, the people of the old base areas would spontaneously hide them, even wielding hoes against outside rebels: "We don't care what mistakes he made outside, but here, he is a hero who risked his life for the revolution. Who dares touch him?"

• Example: General Xu Shiyou had immense prestige in his hometown of Xin County, Henan (in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area). When he returned, the heartfelt support from the people came because they saw him as the living fossil of the region's "unyielding spirit."

2. Realistic Dependence: You Are the Only "Ladder to Heaven"

This is the most practical aspect. After the founding of the PRC, due to the national priority on developing heavy industry and the Northeast, many southern old base areas (like Gannan in Jiangxi, western Fujian, and the Dabie Mountains) were actually very poor, even poorer than before the war (because most able-bodied men had died).

• Mindset: "We have connections in Beijing!"

• Real-life manifestation: The people of the old base areas saw these high officials as the only channel to ask the central government for policies, grain, and funding.

• When the old base areas suffered disasters and had no food, the villagers would directly write to the generals in Beijing: "Can you talk to Chairman Mao and get us some relief grain?"

• When the old base areas needed to build roads or get electricity, the county magistrate and party secretary would take local specialties to Beijing to "run departments and seek funds," asking old chiefs for help.

• Result: The vast majority of old generals could not refuse such requests from their hometowns. They had a strong "debt repayment" mentality — "My life was given by the villagers; now they can't even eat their fill. I feel ashamed to be an official." Therefore, many infrastructure projects in old base areas had the backing of these veteran cadres.

3. Emotional Projection: Seeing You Is Like Seeing My Son

For the elderly who lost their sons or husbands, the surviving high officials are an emotional projection.

• Mindset: Not jealousy, but "identification."

• Scene: When many old generals returned home, they were most afraid of meeting the widows of martyrs. But when they did, the old women would often hold the general's hand and cry, touching him from head to toe. They were not flattering a high official, but through touching this living person, they imagined what their own son would have been like if he had survived — equally imposing, equally strong.

• At such moments, the high official is no longer an official, but the "surviving representative" of all the village's sacrifices. The people feel: "As long as you live well, it means our blood wasn't shed in vain."

4. Class Alienation: Ultimately, They Are "People of the State"

Over time, the people of the old base areas gradually realized that these high officials already belonged to the "state" and no longer completely belonged to "Li Family Village" or "Zhang Family Village."

• Mindset: "More rules, less freedom."

• Real-life manifestation: * Some villagers wanted the high official to arrange a job or pull strings for their nephew. In the early days of the PRC, this was common. But as institutions improved, many upright veteran cadres refused such requests (or could only arrange for them to join the army or become workers, not directly become officials).

• At this point, the villagers would feel a letdown: "Once you become a high official, you don't recognize your poor relatives."

• But in most cases, the people of the old base areas were reasonable. They understood "it can't be helped; these are the rules of the state."

5. A Special Group: The Left-Behind Children of Red Army Soldiers

This is the most heartbreaking group in the old base areas. During the Long March, many commanders left their newborn babies with local families. After the founding of the PRC, these children became "Red Second Generation," but their fates were vastly different from those raised in Yan'an.

• How the old base area people saw them: Both sympathetic and respectful. These children often suffered greatly in the countryside (even persecuted by the Kuomintang because their parents were Red Army soldiers).

• When the high-ranking parents returned to reclaim their children: This was a very complex moment. The villagers would hand over the child they had hidden for over a decade to the general arriving in a jeep.

• The villagers' mindset was often selfless: "We kept your root alive; we have done right by you."

• As for these "princes" left among the people, some were taken back to Beijing to enjoy a comfortable life, while others, having become accustomed to rural life or lacking education, chose to stay in the old base areas as farmers. For the latter, the people of the old base areas would hold them in higher regard, feeling "these are truly our children."

Summary

The feelings of the old base area people toward high officials can be summed up in one sentence: They see high officials as both "debt collectors" and "totems for fulfilling wishes."

• Debt collection: Collecting material help (building roads, allocating funds), because the state owes this to the old base areas.

• Wish fulfillment: Seeing these generals in uniform gives the people a concrete anchor for their wish that "the revolution can lead to a good life."

In this relationship, the people of the old base areas are not humble. On the contrary, many old generals feel humble before their fellow villagers, because they know: The stars on their shoulders are dyed red with the blood of their fellow villagers.