Why was the Learn from Lei Feng campaign launched?
The launch of the Learn from Lei Feng campaign was not a coincidence triggered by a single event, but rather the product of the combined effects of China's specific domestic and international political situation, economic conditions, and ideological needs in the early 1960s.
In simple terms, this campaign was intended both to rebuild social morality and confidence after the "Great Leap Forward," and to politically strengthen the cult of Mao Zedong Thought, while also cultivating "revolutionary successors" in the context of the international "anti-revisionist" struggle.
Below is an analysis of the core background and deeper reasons for the launch of the Learn from Lei Feng campaign:
Lei Feng's Sacrifice and Diary Exposure: In August 1962, Lei Feng, a 22-year-old PLA soldier, died in the line of duty. He was already a model figure in the Shenyang Military Region during his service. After his death, his diary was discovered and compiled, filled with expressions of infinite loyalty to the Party and vows to "be utterly selfless and devoted to others."
Military First, Central Follow-up: The initial propaganda was launched by the Shenyang Military Region and the Communist Youth League system. Subsequently, the editorial department of China Youth magazine requested an inscription from Mao Zedong. On March 5, 1963, Mao wrote "Learn from Comrade Lei Feng," and major newspapers like the People's Daily published it, marking the elevation of this activity to a national-level political campaign.
In the early 1960s, China had just experienced the "Three Years of Difficulty" (Great Famine), which severely damaged the economy, caused extreme hardship for the people, and shook social confidence in socialism to some extent.
Promoting Hard Work and Thrift: The famous details in Lei Feng's diary about "darning socks" and his "savings box" perfectly aligned with the spirit of "diligence, frugality, and hard struggle" urgently needed by the state at that time.
Rebuilding Morality and Confidence: By establishing the image of an ordinary soldier who came from a background of suffering ("an orphan of the old society") yet was full of gratitude and optimism towards the new society, the authorities hoped to boost national morale, unite the people, and convey the simple sentiment of "the Party saved us, we must be grateful."
The Learn from Lei Feng campaign was largely related to the "politics first in military building" line promoted by Lin Biao, who was then in charge of the military.
"Chairman Mao's Good Soldier": After Lin Biao took charge of the Military Commission, he vigorously promoted "giving prominence to politics" and called on the entire army to "study and apply Chairman Mao's works creatively." Lei Feng was portrayed as a model for studying Mao's works (Lei Feng's diary extensively quotes Mao Zedong's words).
A Model of Political Loyalty: The core of learning from Lei Feng was defined as "read Chairman Mao's books, listen to Chairman Mao's words, act according to Chairman Mao's instructions, and be Chairman Mao's good soldier." This was not merely a moral call but a political mobilization to strengthen political loyalty and establish the absolute authority of Mao Zedong Thought.
At that time, Sino-Soviet relations had broken down, and the Chinese Communist Party was raising the banner of "anti-revisionism" (opposing revisionism) internationally.
Preventing "Peaceful Evolution": Mao Zedong was concerned that China might "turn revisionist" like the Soviet Union, especially fearing that the younger generation would forget class struggle.
Cultivating "Communist New People": Lei Feng was seen as the perfect model of being "both red and expert" — this "screw that never rusts" represented the image of a "socialist new person" who completely integrated the individual into the collective and unconditionally obeyed the Party organization. Launching the campaign aimed to ensure the red political power would never change color through role model education.
The successful launch of the Learn from Lei Feng campaign was because the image of Lei Feng perfectly converged the needs of all parties at that time:
For the state: He was a builder who practiced hard work and thrift, helping to rebuild the economy;
For the Party and its leader: He was an obedient and loyal political guardian;
For society: He was a moral paragon who helped others and selflessly contributed.
Would you like me to summarize how the core content of the "Learn from Lei Feng" spirit (e.g., the 'screw' spirit) has evolved or been reinterpreted in different decades since then?
Why did Mao Zedong think the Soviet Union had become revisionist, and why did he oppose revisionism? Was it because the Soviet Union began opposing the personality cult and centralization of power?
Mao Zedong's determination that the Soviet Union had "turned revisionist" (become revisionist) and the subsequent "anti-revisionist" struggle he launched was a turning point of immense historical significance.
Your mention of "the Soviet Union opposing the personality cult" is indeed a core trigger, but regarding the issue of "centralization of power," Mao's logic was more complex. He did not oppose revisionism because the Soviet Union "was no longer centralized," but because he believed the ruling stratum of the Soviet Union had degenerated.
Here is an in-depth analysis:
Your intuition is very sharp. Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which completely repudiated Stalin and criticized the "personality cult," dealt a huge psychological blow and political threat to Mao Zedong.
Fear of shared fate: Mao believed that although Stalin had made mistakes, he represented the authority of the communist camp ("the knife"). Khrushchev's total repudiation of Stalin was seen by Mao as "throwing away Stalin's knife," which not only damaged the legitimacy of the entire socialist camp but also made Mao think of himself: If Stalin could be denounced after his death, would I myself be denounced by a 'Chinese Khrushchev' within the Chinese Party after my death?
Defending the leader's authority: Mao believed that so-called "opposition to the personality cult" was often an excuse used by ambitious people (like Khrushchev) to seize power. Therefore, a hidden motive for his "anti-revisionism" was to maintain the sacred inviolability of the leader (projected from Stalin onto himself).
Mao's opposition to revisionism was not because the Soviet Union became "democratic" or "decentralized." On the contrary, Mao believed that the Soviet Union had produced a privileged bureaucratic stratum detached from and above the masses.
Bureaucratism and the "New Bourgeoisie": Mao believed that Soviet cadres enjoyed high salaries and special privileges, no longer representing the proletariat but instead becoming a new exploiting class (a red bourgeoisie). In Mao's view, this was more dangerous than capitalism because they were waving the red flag to oppose the red flag.
Differences in Economic Policy: The Soviet Union at the time began experimenting with the "Liberman reforms," emphasizing material incentives, profit indicators, and rule by experts. Mao firmly opposed these, advocating "politics in command" and the "spiritual atomic bomb." He considered the Soviet approach to be "restoring capitalism," using money to corrupt the revolutionary will of the workers.
Beyond domestic policy, China and the Soviet Union completely split over their attitudes towards the United States and world revolution.
"Three Peaces and One Reduction": Khrushchev proposed a line of "peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, and peaceful transition" with the United States, attempting to ease US-Soviet relations (despite the Cuban Missile Crisis, the overall trend was détente).
Surrenderism: Mao saw this as surrender to US imperialism and a betrayal of the revolution of the world's oppressed nations. He accused the Soviet Union of fearing nuclear war, calling them "cowards" who had lost the revolutionary essence of Leninism.
This reason, though not often stated openly, was crucial.
Control vs. Anti-Control: As the "big brother," the Soviet Union wanted to control China militarily (e.g., the "long-wave radio station" and "joint fleet" incidents). Mao Zedong placed extreme importance on national sovereignty and would never tolerate the Soviet Union turning China into a dependency.
Social Imperialism: Later, Mao labeled the Soviet Union "social imperialism" (socialist in words, imperialist in deeds), believing it engaged in expansion and aggression abroad (e.g., the invasion of Czechoslovakia). This made Mao feel that the Soviet Union posed a direct threat to China's national security (massing a million troops on the Sino-Soviet border).
This is the most pragmatic point. In the early 1960s, Mao discovered that within the Chinese Party (especially figures like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping), some pragmatic economic policies similar to those in the Soviet Union (e.g., "San Zi Yi Bao") were being implemented.
Criticizing the Soviet Union to Hit Home: By criticizing Soviet "revisionism," Mao was actually warning the domestic pragmatists.
Theoretical Basis for Launching the Cultural Revolution: Mao concluded: "The Soviet Union today is our tomorrow." To prevent China from "turning revisionist," it was necessary to launch a great revolution to expose and overthrow the "capitalist roaders" (those in power taking the capitalist road) within the Party from the bottom up.
Mao Zedong believed the Soviet Union had become "revisionist" based on the following logical loop:
Politically: Repudiating the leader (opposing the personality cult) shook the foundation of rule.
Economically: Implementing material incentives and rule by experts created a privileged stratum (instead of his ideal of egalitarianism).
Diplomatically: Compromising with the US and fearing to pursue world revolution.
Therefore, his opposition to revisionism was not because the Soviet Union "became less centralized," but because he believed the nature of the Soviet regime had changed—from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" and "fascist dictatorship" (Mao's words).
So, 'anti-revisionism' was a label, a container for many things, not a cause but a means?
Your summary is extremely sharp, hitting the nail on the head.
"Anti-revisionism" was indeed not merely a theoretical disagreement; it was more like an all-encompassing "big basket" or a versatile "label."
In the historical context of the time, this label held immense political utility. It perfectly fused the "cause" of ideology with the "means" of realpolitik.
We can deconstruct the "anti-revisionism" label to see what means and purposes it actually contained:
Before this, the Soviet Union was the "big brother"; what Moscow said was socialism, was socialism.
Means: By labeling the Soviet Union "revisionist" (meaning: you betrayed Lenin, you are fake, I am the real one), Mao Zedong was essentially seizing "orthodoxy."
Purpose: To make Beijing replace Moscow as the center of world revolution ("the beacon of world revolution"), allowing China to gain independent discourse power on the international stage, separate from the Soviet Union.
This was the most brutal aspect. If "anti-revisionism" were only directed at the Soviet Union, it wouldn't have turned China upside down.
Means: Mao Zedong equated the policies of domestic pragmatists (like the economic recovery policies promoted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping) with Soviet "revisionism."
Logical Leap: Since the Soviet Union's material incentives were "revisionist," then your "San Zi Yi Bao" was also "revisionist"; since Khrushchev was bad, then you were "the Khrushchev sleeping beside us."
Purpose: To provide legitimacy for launching the "Cultural Revolution." With this label, overthrowing Liu Shaoqi was no longer a "power struggle" but became a "line struggle" and a "life-and-death class struggle."
At that time, China was disconnected from the world and economically struggling. How to make the people willingly endure this?
Means: Establishing a terrifying enemy (Soviet revisionism), propagating that the Soviet people were "suffering a second time" because they had "turned revisionist."
Purpose: To create a sense of crisis and fear. Making the masses feel: although we are poor, we are politically "pure"; although we suffer, we are saving humanity. This was a powerful technique of spiritual control.
Although "anti-revisionism" was a means, we cannot deny that Mao himself in his later years was indeed consumed by a profound anxiety, which formed the psychological basis for his use of this means.
He deeply detested bureaucratism and was intensely enamored with "egalitarianism" and the "supply system."
He genuinely believed that if intense movements (like the Cultural Revolution) were not used to "oppose and prevent revisionism," the Chinese Communist Party would degenerate, and the red political power would change color.
So, your understanding is very accurate: "Anti-revisionism" was a grand political narrative.
Internally: It was a big stick for purging dissidents, cleaning out bureaucrats, and mobilizing the masses.
Externally: It was a banner for breaking free from Soviet control and competing for world leadership.
For Mao personally: It was the ultimate experiment of his later years, attempting to achieve "great order through great chaos" and establish his ideal utopia.
Applying this label solved both the question of who listens to whom (power) and the question of where China was headed (the line), making it the most efficient political tool of the time.